

Social position and attitudes toward domestic issues in Spain*

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INTRODUCTION

For a long time now social science has been confronted with the problem of relating theoretically defined concepts and operational definitions. As Blalock once stated, it seems as though social scientists use two different languages: a theoretical one for thinking and an operational one for doing research.¹ Actually, this apparent divorce between theory and research characterized different stages of sociological thought as the new discipline was coming of age. From a time when research was subordinate to 'theory' (i.e., Comte, Spencer), sociology passed to an antithetical stage of discouragement with 'theory' (i.e., von Wiese), until it finally attained the present synthesis which recognizes the interaction of theory and research (i.e., Merton).²

This synthesis of theory and research, and the recognition that interaction between them will be profitable rather than damaging to sociology, seems to have set aside the old conflict between theoretical and operational concepts.³

* I am indebted to the Instituto de la Opinión Pública for permission to use the raw data on which this paper is based. I also want to thank Pio Navarro and Jacinto Seara for their help in tabulation. José Ramon Torregrosa and José Luis Martín Martínez made penetrant suggestions for which I am very grateful. However, I am solely responsible for the interpretation of data.

¹ Cf H. M. Blalock Jr.: 'Theory, measurement, and replication in the social sciences,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (1961) pp. 342-347.

² I am very pleased to have this opportunity to express my gratitude to Professor Landecker, who provided me with this dialectic scheme to approach the study of different dimensions of sociological theory.

³ Cf. G. A. Lundberg: 'Operational definitions in the social sciences,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 47 (1942), pp. 727-740; and H. Blumer, 'Science without concepts,' *American Journal of Sociology*, 36 (1931), pp. 515-533.

The social position index, designed by Galtung, intends to be an operational definition of a theoretical concept.⁴ Theoretically, Galtung postulates a concentric model of society, in which he distinguishes between the *center* (positions most rewarded by society) and the *periphery* (positions least rewarded by society). He sometimes makes a further distinction within the center, a smaller group of positions which he refers to as the *decision-making nucleus*, and one of a smaller group within the periphery, the *extreme periphery*.

I will not go into the details of his model at this time, since they can be easily found in his publications.⁵ Very briefly, however, one could say that according to the center-periphery theory, the center should show a higher degree of social participation (through voluntary associations and mass media), a higher degree of knowledge (information) especially of policies, and therefore a higher degree of opinion, especially about policies. The process of communication in society, therefore, moves from center to periphery; it is the center that communicates cognitions and evaluations to the periphery.

Other derivations would refer to the process of attitude formation and to the reaction toward those who take decisions: I will refer to some of them below.

The important thing about the index is precisely that it intends to operationalize the concepts of center and periphery as developed theoretically. As Galtung defined it, it comprises eight social characteristics: sex, age, education, income, ecological position, geographical position, occupation, and economic activity. Since each one of these variables is dichotomized, with values of 0 and 1, the index can have values from 0 to 8 for a particular individual. Individuals with index values close to 0 would be considered periphery, while those with values close to 8 would be regarded as center.

In view of Galtung's success with the index as an explanatory (independent) variable for testing some of the hypotheses of his theoretical model, I became interested in its research usefulness and decided to test part of the empirical findings in a different cultural and social context.⁶ The results were very encouraging, and I have continued to explore some of the applications which the index may have for sociological analysis. The purpose of this paper is then, basically, to reproduce some of my earlier findings and to report on some other hypotheses which I have since explored.

⁴ Cf. J. Galtung: 'Foreign policy opinion as a function of social position,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 3-4, 1964, pp. 206-231.

⁵ See, among others, J. Galtung: 'Public opinion and the economics of disarmament,' paper presented at the International Conference on the Economic Aspects of World Disarmament and Interdependence, Oslo, August 29-September 1, 1965; PRIO 12-3, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (mimeographed); J. Galtung: 'A structural theory of aggression,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 2, 1964, pp. 95-119; J. Galtung: 'Attitudes towards different forms of disarmament,' PRIO 11-4, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (mimeographed); J. Galtung: 'Popular inspections of disarmament process,' PRIO 11-5, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (mimeographed).

⁶ J. Díez Nicolás: 'Posición social y opinión pública,' *Anales de Sociología*, 2, 1966, pp. 63-75.

THE SOCIAL POSITION INDEX

Following Galtung's procedures, I constructed an adaptation of the index in the following manner:

Composition of the Social Position Index for Spain

Characteristic	Center (value 1)	Periphery (value 0)
1. Sex ^a	Male	Female
2. Age ^b	30-59	Below 30, over 60
3. Education ^c	Secondary and over	Primary or less
4. Income ^d	10,000 ptas. a month and over	Less than 10,000 ptas. a month
5. Ecological ^e	Urban	Rural
6. Geographical ^f	Central	Periphery
7. Occupation ^g	Nonmanual	Manual
8. Economic activity ^h	Secondary, tertiary	Primary

^a According to the 1960 census, about 48.5% of the population were males, 51.5% were females.

^b According to the 1960 census, about 37% of the total population were between 30 and 59 years old.

^c Since we lack official statistics on this aspect, we have to depend on survey data. According to IOP data, it may be estimated that only about 15% of the population aged 18 years and over have a secondary or higher education.

^d Also depending on IOP survey data, it is estimated that about 12% of the households receive 10,000 ptas. a month or over.

^e Urban is here defined as municipalities of 50,000 inhabitants and over. According to the 1960 census, 33% of the total population were living in such municipalities.

^f Central refers to the province of Madrid plus all provinces with coasts. Periphery refers to interior provinces. About 55% of the total population were living in central provinces in 1960.

^g About 27% of the active population in 1960 were nonmanual workers, according to census data.

^h About 57% of the working population in 1960 were engaged in secondary or tertiary economic activities.

The distribution of the index in Spain, based on different IOP survey sample data is listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Comparison of different distributions of the social position index for Spain, based on national and city samples (percentages)

Index of Social Position	National 1965 ^a	National 1966 ^a	Madrid VII-1964	Madrid XI-1964	Madrid III-1965
8	2	1	2	3	4
7	4	4	4	7	8
6	7	7	11	11	12
5	12	13	17	20	20
4	15	17	19	16	15
3	21	20	35	32	31
2	21	25	12	11	10
1	14	11	—	—	—
0	4	2	—	—	—
N =	(3,535)	(1,962)	(1,408)	(860)	(860)

^a Source: J. Díez Nicolás, "Posición social y opinión pública," *Anales de Sociología*, No. 2, 1966, pp. 63-75.

It should be borne in mind that Galtung always advises to construct the index for national samples, so that a 0 to 8 distribution may result. Thus, in the case of samples of the population of a single city, like Madrid, nobody gets 0 on ecological and geographical characteristics, and therefore the distribution ranges from 2 to 8. Another difficulty with non-national samples, especially when they are small (i.e., XI-64 and III-65), is that the distribution may be bimodal. In those two particular cases, the smaller proportion of 4's result from the overlapping of male and female distributions (males being more concentrated on the upper range and females on the lower range of the distribution), as well as from the marked relationship between education, income, occupation and economic activity.⁷

It will be noted, however, that the distributions resulting from comparable samples are not very different. Thus, the coefficient of dissimilarity for the two national samples is only 7%, and it should be considered that the two samples are quite different in size. Also, the coefficient of dissimilarity between the last two Madrid samples (XI-64 and III-65) is only 3%, the others being 7% (VII-64 vs. XI-64) and 10% (VII-64 vs. III-65).

In spite of the greater advantages of national samples, I think that non-national samples may also be useful, as will be seen later on, because the resulting social position index will still be a good research tool for discriminating among individuals with respect to several 'background' variables at the same time.

⁷ See the relationship among the first three variables, in a Madrid sample, in J. Díez Nicolás: 'Motivaciones, aspiraciones e información en la promoción social,' *Anales de Moral Social y Económica*, No. 11, Centro de Estudios Sociales, Madrid, 1966.

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Theoretically, the center should show a greater degree of social participation through secondary (voluntary associations) and tertiary (mass media) communications, while the periphery should show a greater use of primary communications (personal contacts, face-to-face relationships). This hypothesis was already verified for Spain with the use of national sample data (1965).⁸ Table 2 presents new confirmation for this hypothesis using three similar but not wholly comparable indices of social participation based on data from three different samples of Madrid.

Table 2

Index of Social Participation (PARSO) through mass media, by social position^a

Index of Social Position	PARSO-1	PARSO-2	PARSO-3
8	4.07	3.4	2.4
7	4.13	3.6	2.5
6	3.87	2.9	2.0
5	3.67	2.7	1.9
4	3.53	2.6	1.9
3	3.47	1.9	1.7
2	3.35	1.4	1.4
All	3.58	2.4	1.9

^a All three samples refer to Madrid, and were conducted by IOP (VII-64, XI-64 and III-65, respectively).

PARSO-1 ranges from 0 to 6, and was constructed by combining answers as to means used to obtain information on TV programs, reasons influencing the decision to see a particular movie, spare-time activities, and means used to verify a rumor.

PARSO-2 may range from 0 to 4, and was based on means used to learn about election results in the U.S.A. and Great Britain, about the government changes in the U.S.S.R., and on activities carried out in spare-time.

PARSO-3 may vary from 0 to 5, and was based on the following items: means used to be informed about the Vatican Council, about the new Statute for non-Catholics, about the outcome of Italian elections, about Churchill's death, and vacation activities.

Despite the fact that the three indices differ among themselves, they all show a pattern of greater use of mass media at the center, thus confirming the hypothesis

⁸ J. Díez Nicolás: 'Posición social . . .,' *op. cit.*, p. 71

once more. It is particularly interesting to point out that in all three cases the 7's show a slightly higher participation than the 8's, and it could be theorized that the reason may lie in the fact that 7's have higher expectations of social mobility, since they have not yet 'arrived'. If this explanation is correct, it could be linked to Galtung's suggestion that revolutions are usually led by some elite group, most likely by individuals close to the sources of power but not actually in power, who therefore would be more socially active in terms of participation, as a result of their need — as leaders — to seek as much information as possible.

KNOWLEDGE

Since the center shows a greater degree of social participation (i.e., secondary and tertiary), it should have more knowledge (more, and more varied objects of perception and cognition), i.e., that it should be better informed qualitatively as well as quantitatively. This hypothesis was already verified in my previous article with respect to knowledge about Spain's First Socio-Economic Development Plan.⁹

Table 3 presents data for three surveys conducted in Madrid which again seem to confirm the hypothesis.

Table 3

Index of Information (INFO), by social position^a

Index of Social Position	INFO-1	INFO-2	INFO-3
8	2.46	7.0	5.0
7	1.64	7.0	4.6
6	1.28	4.7	3.4
5	0.89	3.6	3.0
4	0.81	3.8	2.8
3	0.35	2.0	2.4
2	0.27	1.3	1.8
All	0.70	3.3	2.9

^a See Table 2.

INFO-1 ranges from 0 to 4, and is based on knowledge of the name of the director or some columnist of the newspaper read, awareness of the fact that a new Press Law was being studied by the Government, and of the relaxation of film censorship.

INFO-2 could range from 0 to 9, and was based on knowledge about elections in the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, and about the change of Premier in the U.S.S.R.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

INFO-3 could range from 0 to 8, and was based on knowledge about the Vatican Council, the new Statute for non-Catholics, Italian and French elections, and Churchill's death.

Again, although there was some variation in range and items among the three indices, the pattern very persistently exhibits a positive relationship between social position and knowledge.

OPINION

Being more and better informed, the center would be expected also to have more, and more varied opinions than the periphery. The proportion of 'no answer' response to five opinion questions revealed that, as anticipated, the center had considerably more opinions than the periphery.¹⁰ Data from three other surveys, shown in Table 4, again support the hypothesis.

Table 4

Index of Opinion (OPI), by social position^a

Index of Social Position	OPI-1	OPI-2	OPI-3
8	6.89	5.7	8.4
7	6.84	5.3	8.0
6	6.55	4.5	7.5
5	6.29	3.9	7.0
4	6.30	4.0	7.0
3	5.93	2.9	6.4
2	5.63	2.3	5.8
All	6.14	3.6	6.9

^a See Table 2.

OPI-1 ranges from 0 to 9, and is based on whether an answer was or was not given to 17 opinion questions.

OPI-2 could range from 0 to 6, and was based on six opinion questions.

OPI-3 ranges from 0 to 9, and was based on answers to nine opinion questions.

Once more, despite the great variety of topics covered by opinion questions in all three surveys, and notwithstanding the differences in range, the results show a very similar pattern, thus supporting the original hypothesis.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

ATTITUDE FORMATION

Although the data do not allow, so far, to test all the hypotheses concerning attitude formation (i.e., mode of orientation, consistency of attitudes, consistency of attitudes and behavior, consistency with respect to time, and internalization of new policies), two of them could be tested at this moment: consistency of attitudes and internalization of new policies.

According to the theoretical model, the center, having more structured constellations of attitudes, should show a higher consistency of attitudes. At the same time, since communication goes from the center to the periphery, new issues and policies should be internalized first by the center, who would then communicate them to the periphery.

Table 5

Index of Consistency of Attitudes and Index of Internalization of New Policies, by social position ^a

Index of Social Position	CONSIS	INTER-1	INTER-2
8	1.9	1.71	3.2
7	1.5	1.43	2.9
6	1.5	1.28	3.5
5	1.3	1.26	2.9
4	1.3	1.16	2.9
3	1.1	0.97	2.8
2	0.9	1.02	2.4
All	1.3	1.11	2.9

^a Data for CONSIS, and INTER-2 refer to III-65. Data for INTER-1 refer to VII-64.

CONSIS could range from 0 to 3, and was based on consistency of answers given to three pairs of related questions concerning religious freedom, devotion to St. Mary, and the world population problem.

INTER-1 could also range from 0 to 3, and was based on acceptance of the 2 to 4 social norm about ideal family size, acceptance of more press freedom and acceptance of more freedom for motion pictures.

INTER-2 ranges from 0 to 6, and was based on acceptance of a need for closer relations among Christian churches, acceptance of a need to compromise with respect to the cult of the Virgin Mary, acceptance of more freedom in Spain for non-Catholics, recognition of a population problem in the world, acceptance of the need for birth control, and acceptance of the 2 to 4 social norm about ideal family size.

I would agree that, unlike the other indices considered so far, these ones are subject to discussion and disagreement. This is one case where the social scientist's own values may easily interfere with the process of conceptualization. However, it is my personal opinion that smaller families, liberalization, religious freedom, birth control, and similar issues, can safely be regarded as fairly recent issues and policies for Spaniards, regardless of personal opinions. They are issues which have been lately discussed in the press and other media, and on which there is not yet a crystalized public opinion. With respect to family size and religious attitudes, for example, recent studies have shown that some changes are taking place in Spanish public opinion.¹¹

In any case, the data in Table 5 seem to support the two hypotheses: that consistency of attitudes is higher in the center than at the periphery and, secondly, that the center internalizes new issues and policies before they are institutionalized.

As a final comment on Table 5, it should be pointed out that, in INTER-2, the 6's have a higher index value than the 7's and 8's. The explanation might be that this index was composed mainly of religious issues, and it has already been mentioned that, in Spain, the elite has generally been closely related to the Church, and therefore is quite conservative in matters of religion.¹² Still, it should be borne in mind that on the basis of the theoretical model here postulated the 6's are regarded as part of the center, and specifically as that part of the center which because of its higher expectations of social mobility might be more favorable to change.

SOCIAL COSMOLOGY

The kind of hypothesis which refers to social cosmology includes perspective toward social change, style of thought and attitude toward the existing social order.

With respect to attitudes toward social change, it is assumed that the center is more gradualist, while the periphery is more absolutist (wanting total change, quickly and now). Some data used previously seem to support this hypothesis,¹³ but the following data may be used to put it to another test.

¹¹ Cf. J. Díez Nicolás: 'Status socioeconómico, religión y tamaño ideal de la familia urbana,' *Revista Española de la Opinión Pública*, 2, 1965; J. Díez Nicolás: 'Evolución y previsiones de la natalidad en España, 1900-1960,' *Anales de Moral Social y Económica*, Centro de Estudios Sociales, Madrid, 1967; L. Gonzalez Seara and J. Díez Nicolás: 'Progresismo y conservadurismo en el catolicismo español,' *Anales de Sociología* 1, 1966.

¹² Cf. L. Gonzalez Seara and J. Díez Nicolás, *op. cit.* Using their progressivism-conservatism index, it is found that, while 56% of the 6's may be considered progressive, only 37% of the 8's and 28% of the 7's may be so classified.

¹³ J. Díez Nicolás: 'Posición social . . .,' *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

Table 6

Index of Gradualist Orientation Toward Social Change, by social position^a

Index of Social Position	PERCA-1	PERCA-2
8	1.3	64
7	1.1	51
6	0.9	62
5	0.7	52
4	0.6	60
3	0.5	37
2	0.3	40
All	0.6	53

^a Data refer to XI-64 and III-65, respectively.

PERCA-1 ranges from 0 to 3, and is based on answers to three questions about expected changes in diplomatic relations between Spain and the U.S.A., Spain and Great Britain, and the West and the U.S.S.R., as a result of recent government changes in these three countries. A gradualist orientation would seem to be implied in the answer that no major changes would occur immediately, that relations would be 'more or less like now'.

PERCA-2 is not an index, but the percentage distribution of a similar answer about diplomatic relations between Spain and Italy.

Even though the questions used here, as well as those which were used in my previous article, do not really measure attitudes toward social change in a very direct manner, they may be taken as first approximations until other data are available.

The results, however, do point in the direction that would be expected.

ORIENTATIONS TOWARD DOMESTIC ISSUES

The model used here, and especially the process of communication described above (i.e., center internalizes new issues first and then communicates them to the periphery) may be useful for research in other ways.

Hall, for example, used it to describe opinion propagation.¹⁴ If the process of communication is correct, it would imply that issues that are coming 'into' society will do so through the center; they will then be communicated to the middle, and

¹⁴ N. H. Hall: 'Social position and foreign policy attitudes,' *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, 1966, pp. 46-74.

eventually to the periphery, as time goes on; finally they will go 'out' from the periphery. Therefore, in a graphic presentation it would be expected that issues coming 'into' society will be identified because they will receive proportionally greater support in the center, less support in the middle, and very little support at the periphery. (Support would be measured, of course, by means of percentages endorsing a certain issue.) The gradient of the percentage distribution, in this sense, would indicate whether a particular issue is in its way 'into' or 'out' of society.

A good illustration of this kind of structural and trend study is obtained with the aid of IOP data concerning answers about the most important problems for Spain in 1965.

Interviewees were asked to mention which they thought were the two main problems facing Spain at that time. (The question naturally was an open one.) The results for problems mentioned in the first place are given in Table 7, where the social position index is grouped in three categories: center (8, 7 and 6), middle (5, 4 and 3), and periphery (2, 1 and 0).

Table 7
Most Important Problems for Spain, by social position^a

	Trichotomized SP index			Total
	Center	Middle	Periphery	N =
Level of living	24	33	37	(843)
Housing	13	18	19	(451)
Development	17	10	7	(268)
Agriculture	8	9	12	(253)
Education	11	8	6	(199)
Labor problems	3	5	6	(136)
Municipal problems	3	4	3	(95)
Out-migration	2	3	4	(82)
International problems	6	3	1	(76)
Institutionalization	4	2	1	(49)
Social equality	3	2	1	(48)
Too much state control	3	1	*	(20)
Peace	—	*	1	(12)
Other:	3	2	2	(48)

^a Data refer to National 1965.

The first thing noticed in Table 7 is that one problem especially, the level of living, seemed to be the principal one for Spaniards in 1965. Five issues were recognized as 'most important problems' by a larger number: level of living, housing, development, agriculture, and education. The rest were considered important by a minority only.

According to the center-periphery theory, and following Hall's argument, seven out of the fourteen issues are coming 'into' society (see Figure 1). They would in-




Figure 1
Center-Periphery Issues, Spain, 1965

clude: development, education, international problems, institutionalization of the regime, social equality, too much state control, and other problems. Of the other seven, one seems to be passing from center to periphery (municipal problems), and the six left seem to be going 'out of' society: level of living, housing, agriculture, labor problems, out-migration, and peace.

However, these data can also be interpreted differently. If the fourteen issues are divided into two groups according to whether or not they are considered problems by a majority or a minority of the population, one would observe that relatively speaking, the center is more worried about minority problems, while the periphery seems to be more worried about majority problems.

This finding seems to imply a certain divorce between center and periphery, as the center seems to be more worried about minority issues. The only two majority issues (out of the first six on Table 7) supported by the center are development and education, both of which are very real for the center, of course. With respect to development, it should be borne in mind that it will benefit especially the wealthiest financial groups and, at the same time, that these groups have carried out an extensive propaganda campaign to gain popular favor for their policies. (see Figure 2).

Education, on the other hand, is certainly much more accessible to the center than to the periphery, for which reason it is no wonder that the center should worry




Figure 2
Some examples of Center-Periphery Issues, Spain, 1965

more about it. It seems, then, that the center has been successful in communicating to the periphery its own concern for two issues which are particularly operative and timely for the center itself. But, on the other hand, the center does not care so much as the periphery does for other problems which are of vital interest for the latter: level of living, housing, agriculture and labor problems. The first two do not appear so important, relatively speaking, to the center as they are for the periphery, and the reason is, evidently, that, the center, not being *personally* affected by these two problems (because of its higher income), does not consider them as such for the rest of society. In this connection, an index of disparity between level of living and standard of living was constructed, on the assumption

that disparity would be greater for the periphery, as this group has already internalized the ideal 'way of life' without having the economic capacity to reach it.

Evidently the center has propagated to the periphery its own way of life (with respect to material consumption) through advertising, thus creating a wider gap between aspirations and achievements for the periphery. Both indices (level and standard of living) were established according to whether the respondent *owned* and/or considered *necessary* a certain number of household commodities — refrigerator, bath, vacuum cleaner, radio, telephone, TV, sewing machine, automobile, motorcycle, hot water, washing machine, and record player. The results for the three indices are shown in Table 8.

Table 8
Indices of Level of Living, Standard of Living, and Disparity between Level and Standard, by Social Position^a

Index of Social Position	Level of Living	Standard of Living	Disparity between Level and Standard ^b
8	3.97	2.50	0.14
7	2.98	2.62	0.34
6	2.99	2.54	0.47
5	2.19	2.98	0.68
4	2.29	2.33	0.68
3	1.81	2.34	0.74
2	1.69	2.92	0.62

^a Data refer to VII-64.

^b This index was calculated directly from the data, and not determined from the difference between the other two.

Table 8 clearly indicates that the differences between center and periphery with respect to level of living are substantial, whereas they are practically nonexistent with respect to standard of living. The result, as shown by the disparity index, is that disparity between aspirations and achievements is higher at the periphery. With respect to agriculture and labor problems, they certainly affect the periphery more than the center, since the periphery suffers more directly the consequences of problems in both areas (low wages, unemployment.)

If attention is now shifted to minority issues, it is observed that municipal problems mainly constitute a 'middle' issue. The logical explanation would seem to be that the middle positions are probably more identified with the local scene. The periphery, probably recent in-migrants from more rural areas, is probably less concerned with the new local community, while the center is probably rather more concerned with problems that go beyond the local community.

Of all the other minority issues, only two seem to be periphery issues: out-migration and peace. The explanation seems to be different for each. Migration is certainly an important domestic problem, according to the periphery, because it is they who migrate. The center does not seem to be so concerned about a problem which does not affect it personally. Peace, on the other hand, is seen as more im-

portant to the periphery, probably because of its greater propensity to assimilate propaganda from the center, which in recent years has been stressing the great importance of preserving international and domestic peace. However, the proportions giving these answers may be too small to serve as a basis for sound conclusions.

The four remaining minority issues (apart from the 'Other' category) are issues to the center. Certainly one would expect the center to be more concerned with international problems because of its broader information about the world. Institutionalization of the regime and too much state control are of course issues of the center; they are of little concern to a periphery which has little opportunity of becoming personally involved in domestic affairs. And social equality, as one might guess, concerns the center, but as an abstract concept which it is nice to defend.

The periphery, more pragmatic, does not concern itself with these abstractions and worries about more concrete aspects of reality (i.e., level of living and housing).

Generally speaking, therefore, it seems as if this kind of analysis could be useful not only to study the diffusion of issues from center to periphery, but also to compare the relative interest of center and periphery in majority and minority issues. The data here considered seem to suggest a lack of agreement between center and periphery as to which of the domestic issues are most important. There probably is not enough communication (feedback) from periphery to center, with the result that the periphery does not see its interests well represented among the center. Whether this kind of situation may be conflictual is another question, which may be considered in another paper.